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Deep Fakes
Nick Dunard
The dissemination of deep fakes for nefarious purposes poses significant national security risks 
to the United States, requiring an urgent development of technologies to detect their use and 
strategies to mitigate their effects. Deep fakes are images and videos created by or with the 
assistance of AI algorithms in which a person’s likeness, actions, or words have been replaced 
by someone else’s to deceive an audience. Often created with the help of generative adversarial 
networks, deep fakes can be used to blackmail, harass, exploit, and intimidate individuals and 
businesses; in large-scale disinformation campaigns, they can incite political tensions around 
the world and within the U.S. Their broader implication is a deepening challenge to truth in 
public discourse. The U.S. government, independent researchers, and private companies must 
collaborate to improve the effectiveness and generalizability of detection methods that can stop 
the spread of deep fakes.
 Keywords: deep fakes, artificial intelligence, machine learning, generative adversarial 





The Algorithms That Create and Detect Them 
and the National Security Risks They Pose
43Volume 8    2020-2021 
The dissemination of deep fakes for nefarious purposes 
poses significant national security risks to the United 
States, requiring an urgent development of technolo-
gies to detect their use and strategies to mitigate their 
effects in the public sphere. Deep fakes are images or 
videos in which a person's likeness, actions, or words 
have been replaced by someone else’s. Deep fakes illus-
trate how many of the newest national security threats 
that the United States faces are becoming more tech-
nologically advanced and more accessible and easier to 
operate by motivated individuals and groups. 
An interconnected global population and the preva-
lence of smartphones and social media have enabled un-
precedented communication and access to information; 
these technologies have also opened up new avenues of 
attack. Known as “disinformation tactics,” the threats 
take many forms, including social media bot networks, 
fake news stories, blackmail, hacking campaigns, and 
deep fakes. Disinformation tactics meant to attack an 
individual or the public’s consumption of information 
and understanding of the world are not new; however, 
new technologies have allowed their effects to become 
more widespread and harmful. It is likely that deep 
fakes will be used in disinformation campaigns by na-
tion state adversaries like Russia and China.
Deep fakes have the potential in both 
domestic and foreign contexts to sow 
discord, spread misinformation, damage 
reputations, and otherwise harm the 
interests of the United States. 
Deep fakes have the potential in both domestic and for-
eign contexts to sow discord, spread misinformation, 
damage reputations, and otherwise harm the interests 
of the United States. Domestically, deep fakes pose a 
threat to U.S. political and economic processes by tar-
geting specific politicians, business leaders, companies, 
and news events. They also have a high potential to be 
used in areas with less technological literacy and areas 
under less scrutiny by the U.S., where false information 
can spread for longer periods without being detected. 
Countering disinformation campaigns and other mali-
cious attacks that utilize deep fakes will require more 
than just detection methods. Education and communi-
cation with the public will need to be part of any coun-
teraction effort. It is in the best interests of the Intelli-
gence Community to understand how deep fakes could 
be used and how they can be countered.
The artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and other pro-
grams used to create deep fakes become more sophisti-
cated every day, improving their ability to create realis-
tic photos and videos and hampering efforts to create 
detection algorithms and other countermeasures. Gov-
ernment organizations, independent researchers, and 
private companies have made significant progress in 
detecting deep fakes; however, their work has lagged 
behind the pace with which deep fakes are being de-
veloped. There are opportunities to create better, more 
generalized detection methods to combat the harmful 
effects of deep fakes.
Deep Fake Creation 
Deep fakes are images and videos created by or with 
the assistance of AI algorithms to deceive an audience. 
A deep fake could be a realistic photo of a human who 
does not actually exist, or a video of a public figure say-
ing or doing something they did not actually say or do. 
The AI algorithms that create deep fakes differ in many 
ways from the more common applications that AI and 
machine learning have in our lives. The goal of AI is to 
create programs able to “learn” in order to solve prob-
lems that would ordinarily be too difficult for a comput-
er. AI programs may be presented with data which they 
learn from to make predictions about previously unseen 
but related data. For example, a simple AI program may 
be trained to classify the species of an iris flower. The 
program does this by learning the features of the data 
set, in this case the lengths and widths of the petals 
and sepals, and then using that information to make 
informed predictions about a new data set. Deep fake 
creation differs in that the AI does not make a predic-
tion about new data presented to it; instead, it creates 
new data. These algorithms are known as generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs), and recent innovations have 
spurred research and development, leading to the emer-
gence of deep fakes
Neural Networks and GANs
The recent history of deep fakes begins with the devel-
opment of artificial neural networks (ANNs). An ANN 
is a machine learning model based upon a network of 
neurons similar to those in the human brain. In the 
brain, neurons transmit information by producing elec-
trical impulses called action potentials which release 
neurotransmitters. When a neuron receives enough of 
these neurotransmitters, it releases its own action po-
tentials, or inhibits itself, instead not firing. These neu-
rons are connected in large networks, allowing complex 
calculations to be completed. ANNs use this same ar-
chitecture by connecting networks of artificial neurons 
which compute huge numbers of possible combinations 
depending on whether their inputs and outputs are ac-
tive or not. Today, artificial neural networks are used 
by businesses and researchers to accomplish highly 
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complex data-intensive tasks such as classifying images, 
text, and speech.
Building upon ANNs, convolutional neural networks 
(CNNs) model the ways that the visual cortex processes 
images to accomplish computer image recognition. Psy-
chologists David H. Hubel and Torsten Wiesel discov-
ered the structure and inner workings of the visual cor-
tex by conducting experiments on cats in 1958 and 1959. 
Two of their most important discoveries were that many 
neurons in the visual cortex have small local receptive 
fields, meaning that they only react to stimuli within 
a certain region of the visual field, and that some neu-
rons only fire in response to certain orientations of lines 
and objects while not firing for others.  For computer 
vision and image recognition using CNNs, these discov-
eries mean that individual neurons in the network do 
not have to be connected to each other; instead, convo-
lutional layers are used, where neurons only examine 
and respond to the parts of an image in their receptive 
fields. This architecture is important for image recogni-
tion because of the high number of pixels in any given 
image. Artificial and convolutional neural networks are 
the backbone of deep learning programs and inform 
the algorithms that create deep fakes today: generative 
adversarial networks.
Artificial and convolutional neural
 networks are the backbone of deep 
learning programs and inform the 
algorithms that create deep fakes today: 
generative adversarial networks.
Generative adversarial networks were proposed in 2014 
by Goodfellow et al. and have ushered in a new era of 
deep learning research and experimentation, as well as 
the creation of deep fakes. Goodfellow et al. proposed 
a new type of generative machine learning model com-
prised of two competing models: a generative model 
and a discriminative model. The generative and dis-
criminative models are both neural networks, and if the 
task is related to image data, it is likely that they are 
both CNNs. The purpose of the discriminative model 
is to determine if a sample presented to it, such as an 
image, is part of an original, real data set, or if it was 
created by the generative model. The generative mod-
el’s purpose is to create new samples that could have 
come from the original, real data set. The models are 
trained in competition with each other, where the dis-
criminative model attempts to minimize the amount of 
errors it makes in distinguishing “real” data from “fake” 
data, and the generative model attempts to maximize 
that error in the discriminator by creating increasingly 
better fakes. Since the initial proposal by Goodfellow 
et al., there has been a surge in research to improve the 
architecture, efficiency, and realism with which GANs 
can produce images.
In 2016, Yann Lecun, the VP and Chief AI 
Scientist at Facebook, described GANs 
as "the coolest idea in deep learning in 
the past 20 years." 
The idea of placing two neural networks in competition 
with each other is the most innovative aspect of GANs, 
as each network improves the other over time. In 2016, 
Yann Lecun, the VP and Chief AI Scientist at Facebook, 
described GANs as “the coolest idea in deep learning in 
the past 20 years.” While Goodfellow et al.’s GAN frame-
work was revolutionary, the initial capabilities were 
quite limited, as the images it generated were very low 
resolution and often grainy or fuzzy. Three frameworks 
that have improved the image quality and training sta-
bility of GANs since 2014 are deep convolutional GANs, 
least squares GANs, and StyleGAN. These frameworks 
are used in the creation of deep fakes, reducing notice-
able errors and improving their realism.
Deep Fake Creation with GANs
In practice, if a GAN were trained to generate pictures 
of cats, the discriminative model would be trained to 
recognize a cat by using a large data set of different 
pictures of cats. The generative model would then at-
tempt to create an image that looks like a cat using only 
random inputs called “noise.” At the beginning of the 
process, the generative model would not be very effec-
tive, and the discriminative model would have a high 
prediction rate between fake and real. As the generative 
model learns more and more about what the discrimina-
tive model looks for to determine if an image is a cat, it 
can improve its creation of fake cat images. The genera-
tive model never actually sees the pictures it creates. In-
stead, it learns the most important features of the imag-
es from information passed by the discriminator tasked 
with determining whether images are fake or real.
Generative models can be used to produce three main 
types of deep fake videos: face-swap, lip-sync, and pup-
pet-master. Face-swap videos, which replace a face with 
another person’s face, are the easiest and lowest quality 
deep fake to produce. Mobile applications such as Snap-
chat have had similar features for years, and face-swap-
ping is often obvious, as there is usually little done to 
maintain consistencies such as face movements and 
position. Lip-sync videos use existing videos of people, 
and AI manipulates the movements of the mouth to fit 
new audio. A famous example of a lip-sync deep fake is 
the Buzzfeed News-produced video of Barack Obama 
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warning of the dangers that deep fakes and disinforma-
tion pose, with Jordan Peele serving as the voice actor. 
The most realistic type of fake videos are puppet-master 
videos, where a performer acts and says things that they 
want the target to appear to be doing. Then, using AI 
tools, the video is used to animate the target as having 
said and done what the performer did.
National Security Risks
Deep fakes pose national security risks to both indi-
viduals and society as a whole in both foreign and do-
mestic contexts. While fake images present risks, fake 
video and audio allow greater flexibility and therefore 
pose greater threats. Individuals targeted by deep fakes 
face reputational harm, loss of employment, and theft 
and identity fraud. They also may feel threatened and 
powerless to respond or disprove the fakes. At a soci-
ety-wide level, deep fakes can be used to spread disin-
formation; inflame racial, ethnic, cultural, and political 
tensions; influence election outcomes; and destabilize 
the U.S. economy. Changing socio-political develop-
ments like COVID-19, nationwide racial justice protests, 
and national elections exacerbate existing political ten-
sions, opening new avenues for disinformation tactics 
targeting the public.
Deep fakes can be used to 
spread disinformation; inflame racial, 
ethnic, cultural, and political tensions; 
influence election outcomes; and 
destabilize the U.S. economy. 
The American public first truly became aware of online 
influence operations and disinformation campaigns af-
ter the Russian government’s “sweeping and systematic” 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidentialelection, when 
Russian operatives hacked and disseminated a candi-
date's emails and spread fake news through social me-
diaaccounts. The Intelligence Community has assessed 
that foreign actors continued their election interfer-
ence schemes in the 2018 U.S. Congressional Elections 
and in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. And as the 
COVID-19 pandemic spread across the globe and with-
in the U.S. in early 2020, intelligence officials watched 
Chinese operatives orchestrate mass texts to millions 
of Americans warning of an impending lockdown and 
martial law, showing the range of options in disinforma-
tion campaigns. The U.S. Intelligence Community cur-
rently considers efforts like these a top priority, listing 
them second in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment. 
Deep fakes may exacerbate theproblems associated with 
foreign electoral interference, as they provide unprece-
dented realism to false information.
Deep Fake Photos
Deep fake photos pose significant national security risks 
for individuals including extortion, identity theft and 
fraud, and reputational harm. Additionally, they can be 
used to bolster other elements of a disinformation cam-
paign, such as creating more realistic fake profiles and 
infiltrating social networks and organizations. These 
photos are likely to be created by foreign nation states, 
hacking groups, and aggrieved individuals depending 
on the purpose, context, and targets.
Individuals who hold positions of power within the U.S. 
government, private corporations, and large organiza-
tions may be blackmailed, extorted, or threatened with 
deep fake photos. A fake image of someone engaging in 
drug use or other questionable activities can be used to 
leverage information, money, or other things of value. 
According to a Congressional Research Service report, 
foreign intelligence operatives have already begun us-
ing deep fakes in social media profiles to recruit sources 
in the U.S.
Deep fake photos may also be used to improve the re-
alism of other elements of disinformation and online 
influence operations. In 2019, researchers discovered 
a LinkedIn profile of a woman named Katie Jones who 
appeared to be deeply connected to many national secu-
rity experts and other political figures in Washington. 
In fact, no such Katie Jones exists, and many elements of 
her profile indicate that she was likely created by a GAN. 
A scaly effect on her ear, mismatched and monochromat-
ic eyes, a blurry earring, and the indistinct background 
made it clear that the photo was not real. However, the 
profile was still able to connect with more than 50 us-
ers on LinkedIn, including a deputy assistant secretary 
of state. Similar fake accounts are likely to be used to 
connect with influential members of government and 
business to siphon confidential information, create 
compromising situations, or to recruit them to directly 
work with foreign governments. While the Katie Jones 
profile was detected quickly due to the low quality of 
the image, more sophisticated efforts to fine-tune the 
generation algorithm can produce fake images that fool 
the naked eye.
Deep Fake Video and Audio
Deep fake video and audio productions are more likely 
to pose serious national security risks at a society-wide 
level than photos due to the limitless possibilities of 
what can be created and shown. While the most serious 
threats are likely to be in the domestic context, such as 
those that target our elections and economy or try to 
spark hatred and division, serious threats could emerge 
from the spread of fake videos targeted at individuals 
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or in other countries. The technology used to create 
these videos has only gotten better, and it may now be 
used to interfere in deeper, more sinister ways against 
the U.S. and its citizens.
In more personal or intimate contexts, deep fake videos 
can be used to harass and intimidate individuals with 
blackmail or revenge porn. The first deep fake videos 
emerged in 2017 when internet users interposed the fac-
es of celebrities between those of actors in pornograph-
ic videos. Since then, researchers have found that over 
90% of deep fake videos are non-consensual porn, main-
ly targeting women. A report by the Cyber Civil Rights 
Initiative indicates that 90% of revenge porn victims 
are women, and that many have suffered reputational 
and emotional consequences as a result. Recent mobile 
and computer applications make it easy to create these 
videos: typically, just a few pictures from social media 
accounts are enough. Online communities have formed 
to share and request porn deep fakes of individuals and 
celebrities, which normalizes the behavior for would-
be perpetrators. In one case, a mother of a high school 
cheerleader created deep fake videos and photos show-
ing her daughter’s rivals on the team naked while smok-
ing and drinking to get them kicked off of the team. A 
concern regarding deep fakes videos being used in local 
or individual contexts is the difficulty of proving that 
they are fake. Without the resources that researchers 
and media organizations can bring to bear, individuals 
are susceptible to reputational harm, shame, and harass-
ment. While instances like the one above do not pose 
significant national security threats to the U.S., they do 
create serious civil liberties and privacy concerns and 
are likely to be the majority of cases involving deep 
fakes. 
Deep fake videos provide 
unprecedented customization, targeting, 
and believability to hostile foreign actors 
working to spead disinformation. 
Deep fake videos can target politicians, business lead-
ers, minority groups, activists, celebrities, members of 
our armed forces, or anyone else in a position of pow-
er or influence. Politicians could be displayed taking 
bribes or saying racist phrases, and the CEO of a com-
pany could be heard talking about a coming recession, 
triggering panic selling in the market. A video could 
circulate of police officers indiscriminately assaulting 
innocent civilians, causing riots across the nation be-
fore it can be disproven. According to Special Counsel 
Robert S. Mueller III in his 2019 Report on the Investigation 
into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, a 
major element of the Russian social media campaign in 
the months leading up to the election was to “provoke 
and amplify political and social discord in the United 
States.” Deep fake videos provide unprecedented cus-
tomization, targeting, and believability to hostile for-
eign actors working to spread disinformation.
A video appearing to show House Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
slurring her words, almost as if she was drunk, spread 
rapidly on social media in 2019, even being tweeted 
by former President Trump with the caption, “PELOSI 
STAMMERS THROUGH NEWS CONFERENCE” (@re-
alDonaldTrump, May 23, 2019). In truth, Pelosi had not 
slurred her words revise: words, and the video was not a 
deep fake. Instead, the perpetrators had simply boosted 
low frequencies in the audio, prompting House Intelli-
gence Chairman Adam Schiff to refer to the effort as 
a "cheap fake." The episode highlights the threat that 
deep fake videos pose to our political system and the 
rapid speed with which they can be seen and spread 
by millions of people. While news organizations were 
quick to debunk the video and social media companies 
worked to stymie its spread, new questions arose about 
what could be next. What if there were no “real” video 
to show alongside the fake? What if an accompanying 
video emerged a few days later showing that Speaker 
Pelosi had actually been drinking? This is the problem 
that deep fake videos and audio pose: they create narra-
tives out of whole cloth, with little that can be done to 
fight them. 
This is the problem that deep fake 
videos and audio pose: they create 
narratives out of whole cloth, with little 
that can be done to fight them. 
Deep fake videos pose national security risks for the 
United States when they are spread in a foreign con-
text. A video could be created and spread in another 
country to show U.S. military personnel engaged in war 
crimes or the murder of civilians, leading to increased 
radicalization, violence, and resentment against the 
U.S. These videos could spread widely before being de-
tected, leaving populations vulnerable to unsuspected 
threats. Individuals in other countries may also possess 
lower levels of digital literacy, increasing the likelihood 
that deep fake videos will be believed. In late 2018 in Ga-
bon, for instance, a video intended to reassure citizens 
of President Ali Bongo’s good health was called a deep 
fake by his political opponents. They pointed out that 
his eyes seemed immobile and did not move in sync with 
his jaw. Outside experts following the controversy said 
that there was no way to know for sure if the video was 
a deep fake, but his opponents launched an unsuccessful 
coup as a result of their belief that it was. Similar tactics 
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could be used around the world to remove U.S.-friendly 
leaders or cause allies to reconsider their positions to-
ward the U.S.
Deep Fake Detection and 
Countermeasures
Government agencies, independent researchers, and 
private companies have created methods and tools able 
to detect hyper-realistic deep fake photos, video, and 
audio. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agen-
cy has developed two programs to identify and combat 
manipulated media: MediFor (media forensics), which 
assesses the technical integrity of images or videos, and 
SemaFor (semantic forensics), which assesses semantic 
issues in manipulated media such as mismatched eye 
colors and earring placements. Both Google and Face-
book have released data sets of deep fake and real vid-
eos in hopes of spurring independent innovation of de-
tection methods. Content publishers like Facebook have 
also imposed greater restrictions in the effort to stop 
the spread of altered media like deep fakes. However, 
these restrictions are quite narrow and hard to apply 
due to their strict requirements about how the manip-
ulated media was created and the intent of the poster, 
meaning they are likely to be ineffective in fully stop-
ping the threat.
Many deep fakes are low quality and can be easily iden-
tified by semantic differences, image quality, and other 
oddities. In the Katie Jones LinkedIn profile, for exam-
ple, researchers quickly identified artifacts that made 
the image look distorted and degraded. Common indi-
cators of deep fake images and videos include skin be-
ing overly smooth or lacking details, scaliness or blur-
riness, flickering, odd head positions, face warping, and 
unnatural personal patterns of behavior including eye 
and lip movements. 
When these issues are present, it can 
be easy to debunk fake images and 
videos; when they are not, more 
technical solutions are required.
When these issues are present, it can be easy to debunk 
fake images and videos; when they are not, more tech-
nical solutions are required. Many of these issues have 
already been solved in the latest GAN frameworks, and 
CNNs and GANs increasingly make it possible to pre-
serve pose, facial expression and lighting in images and 
videos, meaning that detection methods will have to 
be constantly updated to compensate. Independent re-
searchers have created several detection techniques of 
varying effectiveness and scope; however, more general-
ized and transferable solutions are still needed.
Deep Fake Photo Detection
One of the most successful methods for detecting deep 
fake photos relies on artifacts left behind during the 
creation process. In 2019, Durall et al. used high fre-
quency component analysis to detect artifacts hidden 
to the human eye indicating that an image may have 
been manipulated. The team's model achieved 100% ac-
curacy identifying patterns of fakes during supervised 
learning tests—when a team member offered input 
and guidance—and 96% accuracy during unsupervised 
learning tests. Real and fake images have significantly 
different frequencies that allow them to be classified as 
either real or fake. While the model struggled to detect 
lower-resolution deep fakes, this is not a major issue, as 
these images are less convincing and have less potential 
to cause harm.
In 2020, Hsu, Zhuang, and Lee used pairwise learning 
and a common fake feature network to identify deep 
fake photos.  The team's study proposed that by using 
pairs of images, one real and one fake, they could train 
their common fake feature network (CFFN) model to 
identify the most common features of deep fake images. 
Once the CFFN has been trained to identify the most 
common features, it can identify whether new images 
are deep fakes. This method works best on fake face de-
tection, as many of the features across different faces 
are quite similar, unlike general objects in the world 
which vary in shape, size, color, and more. Hsu et al. not-
ed that their CFFN may have trouble identifying deep 
fake images if new generators creating new fakes differ 
significantly from the generator used to train the CFFN.
Deep Fake Video and Audio Detection
Several video detection methods can be applied to any 
deep fake video. In 2019, Korshunov and Marcel used 
two detection techniques to examine the susceptibility 
of facial recognition software to deep fake face swaps, 
with varying degrees of success. First, they found that 
facial recognition software failed up to 95% of the time 
on deep fake videos, meaning that the software iden-
tified the faces in the videos even though they were 
face-swapped. To combat this issue, they compared an 
audio-visual approach looking at lip-sync and mouth 
movements against an image quality technique. They 
found that the audio-visual approach was highly ineffec-
tive, as the deep fake videos accurately matched mouth 
movements with audio. On the other hand, the image 
quality technique, which measured signal to noise ra-
tio, blurriness, and other signifiers, was able to identify 
deep fake videos with more than 90% accuracy. 
A similar technique proposed by Güera and Delp uses 
a recurrent neural network with two components: a 
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CNN for frame feature extraction and a long short-term 
memory for temporal sequence analysis. Given an input 
video, the CNN obtains a set of features for each frame. 
Next, the features of a consecutive sequence of frames 
are combined and analyzed by the long short-term 
memory to produce a likelihood estimate for the proba-
bility of a video being a deep fake or not. Their method 
achieved accuracies greater than 97%, even using less 
than two seconds of video. This robust and generalized 
detection method and its ability to achieve high accu-
racies given low amounts of input will be important to 
consider in future detection research. 
A more specifically tailored deep fake video detection 
method was proposed by Agarwal et al. to protect world 
leaders against deep fakes. They extracted data about 
the facial and head movements from hundreds of hours 
of footage of U.S. politicians including Barack Obama, 
Donald Trump, and Bernie Sanders. They found that the 
specific movements of each individual were quite differ-
ent, meaning that they could be used to identify that 
individual. Agarwal et al. then trained a model on both 
real videos and deep fake videos of each of the leaders 
and found an average accuracy of 91% across the three 
main types of deep fake videos. However, their model’s 
accuracy dropped to between 61%–66% for videos where 
the speaker was not facing the camera. Techniques like 
this reveal innovative ways that deep fakes can be de-
tected, but it is unlikely that they can be generalized or 
used to combat deep fakes not targeting famous people.
Implications
On April 26, 2020, the first deep fake targeting the 2020 
U.S. election spread widely on Twitter and was retweet-
ed by President Donald Trump. The deep fake, a gif of 
Vice President Joe Biden raising his eyebrows and roll-
ing his tongue around, originated from a Twitter ac-
count called “@SilERabbit” that mainly posted messages 
in favor of Bernie Sanders, who had dropped out of the 
Democratic Party's presidential primaries on April 8. 
While Trump had amplified edited media before, such 
as the Nancy Pelosi slurring video, this instance was 
different in that the content was completely fabricated. 
Journalist David Frum pointed out in The Atlantic that 
Trump’s retweet “looks like an experimental test of the 
rules of social media.” It is not clear how the deep fake 
of Biden appeared in Trump’s timeline or if it was sent 
to him by someone else, but it raises questions if the 
spread was orchestrated by foreign actors. 
This incident may be a sign of a larger shift in how dis-
information campaigns since the 2016 election postmor-
tem are being carried out. While the Russian operation 
to interfere in the 2016 election succeeded in co-opting 
and influencing news coverage and in engaging many 
American voters' attention, it failed in that the opera-
tion was detected and exposed in great detail. The Rus-
sians covered their tracks poorly, leaving behind online 
transactions, email accounts, correspondence, and other 
digital identifiers that allowed investigators to paint a 
detailed picture of the operation and to secure multi-
ple indictments against the perpetrators. In the wake 
of this exposure, Russia and other foreign actors have 
sought to increase deniability and believability by out-
sourcing their operations. In 2019, the New York Times 
reported that “Rather than impersonating Americans as 
they did in 2016, Russian operatives are working to get 
Americans to repeat disinformation."
While the goals and content have 
remained constant, the tactics have 
changed, making it harder to track 
the origin of disinformation and the 
perpetrators behind it. 
Evidence of the shift in Russian tactics has emerged 
in Africa over the past year. In late October 2019, Face-
book removed three networks of accounts that had been 
spreading disinformation in Mozambique, Cameroon, 
Sudan, and Libya. These accounts were linked to Yevge-
ny Prigozhin, who the U.S. indicted for meddling in the 
2016 election. A 2020 CNN investigation found that Rus-
sian operatives linked to the Internet Research Agency 
have outsourced the actual running of accounts and 
posting to workers in nations like Ghana and Nigeria. 
These Russian-backed trolls have posted content target-
ed towards Americans to incite racial tensions and so-
cial unrest. While the goals and content have remained 
constant, the tactics have changed, making it harder to 
track the origin of disinformation and the perpetrators 
behind it. 
While deep fakes today are usually easy to spot, they 
may not be in the future. Research into detection algo-
rithms must at least match the development of creation 
algorithms. In turn, social media companies like Twitter 
and Facebook will need to employ these techniques at 
scale on their platforms. Major news organizations and 
other groups focused on fighting disinformation and 
providing transparency in technology will also need to 
adopt them.
The emergence of deep fakes presents many immediate 
challenges, but the broader issue is the continuing and 
deepening challenge to truth in our discourse. The U.S. 
is already incredibly divided by partisan rhetoric and 
media organizations that spread tensions across the po-
litical spectrum. Foreign actors further inflame these 
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tensions, leading to greater distrust in institutions and 
a lack of regard for the truth. Citron and Chesney refer 
to this deepening spiral as the "liar's dividend," in which 
citizens' growing awareness of deep fakes makes it in-
creasingly easy to question the truth in any situation. As 
the public becomes more aware that deep fakes could be 
anywhere, they "may have difficulty believing what their 
eyes or ears are telling them—even when the informa-
tion is real."
It is unclear whether this new 
reality of disinformation, charged 
rhetoric, and increasing skepticism is 
a fleeting element of the moment 
or if it is here to stay. 
Americans have rarely vested full faith in their govern-
ment, its institutions, and the media who report on both, 
but recent shifts in information and discourse have been 
rapid and startling. Accusations of “fake news,” a term 
all but unheard of before 2016, are levied against all 
critical reporting by those who hold positions of power, 
no matter how valid. It is unclear whether this new re-
ality of disinformation, charged rhetoric, and increased 
skepticism is a fleeting element of the moment or if it 
is here to stay, but deep fakes are certainly accelerating 
their influence on American discourse. 
The fight for truth in American discourse faces a grim 
future. At the same time that foreign influence cam-
paigns are becoming less expensive to operate and more 
successful in their reach and effect, the algorithms and 
programs used to create deep fakes are advancing much 
more rapidly than detection algorithms, regulations, 
laws, and societal demand for change. Russia may have 
invented the playbook in 2016 for successful online dis-
information campaigns, but other nations and groups 
have been quick to adopt Russia's strategies. The In-
telligence Community has already assessed that Iran 
and China have ramped up their election interference 
schemes, but disinformation does not stop at our elec-
tions.1 Socio-political developments like the COVID-19 
pandemic provide opportunities for malicious actors to 
spread disinformation and increase political tensions 
and polarization in the U.S. Deep fakes increase the 
potential damage of disinformation campaigns in too 
many imaginable ways, providing unprecedented be-
lievability to complete fabrications. 
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